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The Name of the 
Unnamable or Tragedy of 
Self in Samuel Beckett
Yücel Dursun
THIS article aims to exemplify, through a philosophical approach, how 
Samuel Beckett’s novel, translated into English under the name Trilogy 
– consisting of three stories, Molloy, Malone Dies, and Unnamable – can 
be read in relation to speciﬁc philosophical doctrines. In exploring the 
content of these three stories and the narrative structure of the novel as a 
whole, which takes on a manifestly expressive form in The Unnamable, the 
ﬁrst argument of this article will expostulate that what the subject lives 
through in his struggle to reach out for his Self is essentially the problem 
of being Self, where the latter is taken as either a problem that is “out 
there”, though far away, or one that is “lost as soon as it is accomplished.” 
The problems presented here embody a paradox that can be expressed, 
perhaps, as “speaking for silence”. In an attempt to address this paradox, 
the second argument will present this same paradox as deriving from some 
type of tragedy experienced by the subject. This tragedy, which highlights 
the signiﬁcance of the paradox, is the frustration of the Self as a subject 
trying on one hand to make himself, in various dynamic forms, an object 
within the reality, and his attempt to articulate this on the other.
This article will take as its starting point a description of the general 
characteristics of the narratives and explore the discussions centered 
around them. It will then move on to the problem of the self, elucidating 
the centrality of the latter to the ﬁctive subjects of these narratives – in fact 
central to those subjects-construed-by-subjects – based on the readings of 
the text. Finally, I will address the tragedy leading to this problem of the 
self, which can potentially be experienced by any reﬂective subject. 
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General Characteristics of the Stories
The general or overarching characteristics of Beckett’s stories can be 
evaluated vis-à-vis the general themes of the narration, its language and 
the connection between them. What is markedly distinct in each of the three 
stories is the presentation of the narrators’ own deﬁciencies (disability, 
old-age, loneliness, absence of a powerful and vivid memory, inability to 
know the whole, inability to know the self, inability to reach out the self, 
etc.) 1 as enclosed monologues, whereas the outer world they live in is 
ignored. Sometimes the narrators relate these deﬁciencies by constructing 
real life situations involving themselves (as is particularly apparent in the 
character of Molloy), while at other times, they are the expressed creations 
of the narrator (as in the example of Malone). Sometimes the narrator does 
not seem to be telling, even in implicit fragments, a meaningful story. As 
matter of fact, the narrator is again telling the real story, the subject-matter 
of the previous two stories, a speciﬁc life condition, which reveals itself 
as the pursuit, catching, knowledge, and articulation of the identity of 
the Self – that is, the thing he experiences as a subject (intensely in The 
Unnamable).
These desperations and deﬁciencies, which are the outcomes of certain 
life situations and conditions, are also reﬂected in the language of Beckett’s 
narrators. However, this does not take the style or form of direct narration, 
but rather of contradictions and negations, as echoed in the narrator’s 
sentences. For instance, it is possible to ﬁnd examples of contradicting 
sentences such as: “I had only to want to. And yet no, for I did want to.”2 
or “It is midnight. The rain is beating on the windows. It was not midnight. 
It was not raining.” (Beckett 182). The narrators make frequent use of such 
seemingly contradicting sentences and the like throughout his narratives. 
He replaces or displaces a sentence for another through direct or indirect 
negation. This technique, according to Iser, is the characteristic feature of 
the style in each of the three stories:
The sentence construction in this [In Molloy] and the subsequent novels is 
frequently composed of direct contradictions. A statement is followed by the 
immediate retraction of what has been stated. The degree of contradiction 
varies from modiﬁcation or patent undermining right through to total 
negation.3
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Still, why is the narrator in need of such a technique? The answer to the 
question may be this: it is related to the thing intended to be narrated or 
transferred via the stories and the linguistic possibility of transferring that 
thing. If, above all, certain life situations of the subject are to be transferred 
through a particular language, this is possible with the experienced reality 
unbound by the same language. Otherwise, what is experienced in reality 
will be one thing, and the way of transferring that which belongs to the 
agent’s language will be another. However, the linguistic style in Beckett’s 
stories seems to depict the opposite.
Smith, writing in relation to the Trilogy’s narrative structure, notes 
that, “as the Trilogy’s narrative is played out, motion that was thought 
to be linear turns out to be circular”.4 The Circularity5 of the narrative is 
that the sense of time in the Trilogy is circular and is closely related to 
the subject.6
Reality experienced by the subject, as will be further referred to, is 
made of concentric circles7 imprisoning8 the subject. In Smith’s words, it is 
“an imprisonment of the Self within a labyrinth”. (Smith 74) For the Self, 
reality that is experienced resembles a labyrinth and this reality is a variety 
of predicaments the Self desires to overcome, i.e. the desire to overcome 
the impossible. Conveying “what is experienced” corresponds to one of 
these predicaments because what is “conveyed” in the stories is at the same 
time what is “experienced.” In other words, while expressing something, 
the narrator experiences the thing(s) that causes him to articulate it in a 
particular manner, and in the process, that original expression gives way 
to the expression of his present state. Therefore, the reality of subject 
is closely related to the language that expresses it. As we have already 
mentioned, this relationship refers to an impossible situation. For, as 
reality is tried to be transmitted as it actually is, “the way it is expressed” 
is also included in the reality. The language style of the narrator, however, 
seems to be an effort to overthrow such impossibility. This style of the 
language in narratives, as stated above, poses a challenge against the 
rules of expression. Thus, the language used by the narrator, despite 
its contradictions, claims a closer link to reality. On the one hand, the 
style of language employed by the narrator (contradictions, take-backs, 
Yücel Dursun: The Name of the Unnamable or Tragedy of Self in Samuel Beckett
L&A 2007.1.indd   19 21/2/08   7:54:20 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 17(1) July 2007, page 20 
and alternations) is an attempt to mirror the contradicting, renouncing, 
and negating language as used in reality, while, on the other, that same 
language leads to a narrative diversity by the appearance, through writing, 
of reﬂections made over the attempts to reach out for reality. This means 
that the style of language is related to reality in two ways. The ﬁrst arises 
from the fact that the conveyance of reality is a part of the reality itself. 
That is, the conveyor experiences the reality as it is in the very moment 
he conveys. In this respect, contradictions, renunciations or negations are 
always present in the style of language since reality is experienced in the 
same way as during the conveyance. The narrator either skips from one 
idea to another or just omits it. The second relationship between a style 
of language and reality is a reﬂective one – reﬂective in the sense that the 
narrator ﬁrst conveys something, and then he conveys his state of mind 
or perception that makes him convey the former, and the cycle goes on. 
This is why he can easily negate or alter the initial statements, for what 
he attempts to convey undergoes successive levels of transmutations, and 
this alteration is precisely what is reﬂected in the conveyance. Thus, the 
language of the narratives is related to reality in two forms. The ﬁrst is 
to experience the reality in the very moment of the conveyance, and the 
second is to go back to it using the conveyance as a means. In terms of 
the second aspect of the conveyance, the narrator constructs the road to 
reality with his narrative. 
Still, which conveyance is it that is conveyed? How far is the narrator 
from the reality he is trying to transfer? Or, to put it another way; how 
does the relationship between the narrative style and the narration develop 
in regard to the reality? Iser thinks that it is “through the nature of his 
narrative” that “Molloy gives a number of indications both directly and 
indirectly as to what stipulates all of these contradictory statements.” 
(Iser165) According to Iser, the reﬂection of the narrator is thus:
Embedded in a process which Molloy would like to narrate but which he 
has to falsify because the convention of narration has its own laws that 
have little or no bearing upon actual reality. Narration sets out to convey 
something which cannot possibly be conveyed by it, and so any narrative 
representation must inevitably be a lie. (Iser 166)
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It is because of this that the narrator, or the one who is in the act of 
telling, sometimes has to falsify or modify a particular sentence in the very 
subsequent one. This, in turn, leads to a variety of narrative techniques 
emerging with various changes. Therefore, according to Iser, as the 
presentation and transfer of any given reality has to end up in modiﬁcation 
of that reality, the teller conveys contexts of the reality as part of his 
presentation which unfortunately do not comply with reality because the 
latter can be nothing but itself. (166) This is because diversity in narration 
develops in accordance with the mode of the teller’s presentation. In this 
respect, by indulging in his own mode of narrative and building the new 
narrative out of his perception that stipulates the previous narrative, the 
narrator keeps away from not only what is happening in his narrative in 
reality, but is seemingly distant from the original reality. Yet, it is at this 
precise moment that he ﬁnds himself closest to that reality. In this sense, 
the narrative can be seen as the narrative of the perception stipulating 
every narrative, and the narrative of what stipulates it is the reﬂective 
condition of the teller. Thus, with his narrative, the chain of reﬂections are 
triggered, and so whenever the teller needs to reﬂect upon his Self, he will 
inevitably want to narrate certain things. And this chain of reﬂection in the 
narratives of the teller is seen as a deviation from the original narrative. 
Meanwhile, it brings the teller closer to his Self as to the perceptions that 
lead, or are leading him to create the narrative.
On the one hand, as in Molloy, what befalls the latter at the end, or 
what happens to the detective tracking him remains unresolved. The 
unresolved nature of the narratives, however, is of little importance. In fact, 
as it can be seen in Malone Dies, the narrator’s story of his own and other 
narrations (Sapo and others) have all been incomplete. It is because what 
matters is not what they are, but the context that can be reﬂected through 
them. This situation presents itself so overtly in the ﬁrst two stories that 
in Molloy, the detective confesses the ﬁctive nature of both himself and 
the narrative (Beckett 114-115). Iser writes:
This insight is conveyed by the alternation of statement and modiﬁcation 
throughout the narrative, for every statement imposes a particular order of 
things, thus excluding much of what might really be. (Iser 166)
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On the other hand, this is not the ultimate evaluation regarding the 
narrator’s style of language. As Iser points out, it matters little whether 
the narrator is the conveyer of reﬂections, of recorded perceptions as to 
how and where each context is constituted – resulting in the narration of 
little pieces often digressing from the main story, as in the probability story 
of Molloy (Beckett 69-74) – or, for this reason, he decides to concentrate 
on the process of interpretation by driving the conscious attention of the 
mind away from the actual interpretation of things (Iser 166-7). What does 
matter is that they are in pursuit of the self through their own narrations 
and ﬁctive images belonging to their own life situations. In Malone, the 
narrator is aware of this when he says, “It [writing] is in order to know 
where I have got to go, where he has got to go”. (Beckett 208) 
Self seeking to see its being in the sound of silence
The case emerging as the story-teller’s recession from reality through 
what he says, and showing itself in the language of the stories, brings 
about the teller’s becoming closer to himself with a reﬂection he makes 
through writing. This is the reason why in Molloy, there are more complete 
(or nearly-complete) stories, whilst in Malone, there tends to be more 
incomplete and diversiﬁed narratives branded together with ﬁctive 
pieces narrated by a ﬁctive teller, and in contrast to both of the above, 
The Unnamable is a story of reﬂection that focuses only upon the Self. It is 
because the sequence of the stories is both arranged in line with writing 
and a reﬂection upon the Self that the latter becomes more apparent as 
the writing proceeds.
In The Unnamable, the narrator ﬁnds himself in the “Now” and “Now”, 
and says: “Hell itself, although eternal, dates from the revolt of Lucifer. 
It is therefore permissible, in the light of this distant analogy, to think of 
myself as being here forever...” (Beckett 298)
This sense of the narrator’s “now” and “here” is envisaged again 
(remaining a recurrent theme throughout) when he declares, “And indeed 
I greatly fear, since my speech can only be of me and here...”(Beckett 304), 
or when he states that “I was anywhere but here, no one ever got me out 
of here.” (Beckett 326) This is the basic and innermost of the concentric 
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dungeons that the narrator ﬁnds himself in. It is in the “Now” and 
“Here” that the narrator exists. Taking these two concepts in a Hegelian 
approach, the “Here” is itself inexhaustible, but remains constant during 
the vanishing of “that what is here”, and in this sense not different from 
“that what is here” (Hegel 61). Likewise, the “Now” is also not different 
from “That is in Now”.9 This can be further clariﬁed as: “Now” and 
“Here” in their respective singularity sustain their being “Now” and 
“Here”. This in a sense means each singular is always “Here” and “Now” 
in terms of singularity. For example, the glass on my desk is “Here” and 
“Now”. Even if a certain period of time passes and its position alters in 
some way or other, for the glass it is still the same “Here and Now”. This 
is because each singular case and time of the glass is “Now and Here” as 
to that singularity. Secondly, they are indifferent from that is “Now” and 
“Here”. For each singular existing in “Now” or “Here” primarily exists in 
“Here” and “Now” due to the very singularity in question, and therefore 
is not different from it. As seen in the glass example, its being “now” and 
“here” is the same as the period of time and place it is in. It can be seen 
that being “Now and Here” is being in no particular or general situation. 
Hegel calls this situation sense-certainty. However, what we use and 
conceptualize linguistically as “Now and Here” are general concepts and 
involve plurality, or in other words, they are plural-oriented. For instance, 
even in the moment of uttering as “now”, many “now’s” might occur from 
the beginning to the end of our utterance – or each of the points supposed 
to have “occurred” is in the position of a “Now” – and in uttering “now”, 
we express the general comprising all this plurality. Thus, these singular 
“Now’s” and “Here’s” mentioned here, in the Hegelian sense, gain 
plurality through the reﬂections and negations upon themselves. Hence, 
there exist many “Now’s” and “Here’s”. There is a movement from the 
“Here” received as many “Here’s” towards the general “Here”, which is 
a simple plurality of “Here’s”. (Hegel 64) The same applies for “I”, and 
the generic “I” is involved with “Now”, “Here” and “I” experiences that 
are not general in the sense-certainty.
The narrator of The Unnamable feels, as an “I”, his self almost 
imprisoned in this singularity of sense-certainty since in every point he 
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is conﬁned by the singular “Now” and “Here”. He tries to breach this 
imprisonment, saying:
And indeed I greatly fear, since my speech can only be of me and here, that 
I am once more engaged in putting an end to both. Which would no matter, 
far from it, but for the obligation, once rid of them to begin again, to start 
again from nowhere, from no one and from nothing ... (Beckett 304). 
The Narrator has to re-start in every attempt of escape because in 
each point there is the singularity of both his “I” and “Here.” As singular 
the “Here” is indifferent from the singular “what is here”, it always 
accompanies it. However, he can reach out for his self to gain a move, 
a progress with a Hegelian negation through these singularities. In this 
context, he is a subject continuously “seeking” some things,10 and a subject 
especially seeking “his self”.11 To “know”12 and reach13 his self is for he who 
wants to be himself,14 because he does not know his self.15 To know his 
self, to be his self, the subject (or the narrator), must above all get out of 
the dungeon of “Now” and “Here”. The effort to escape the dungeon 
in The Unnamable is thus deemed to be a progress: “For to go on means 
going from here, means ﬁnding me, losing me, vanishing and beginning 
again, a stranger ﬁrst, then little by little the same as always, in another 
place...” (Beckett 304)
In fact, this activity of the narrator is an effort referring to his Self which 
is “out there”. But the narrator was only a singular “I” that can be counted 
as an ally of His Self out there.16 Therefore, in the attempt to overcome 
the ﬁrst circle – “Now and Here” – there is another circle: singular “I” 
situations. In The Unnamable, for instance, Iser illustrates that in each case 
the sentences resemble each other, and they expose the impregnability 
of the Self and its passion to observe itself. (Iser 171) He writes: “he [the 
Unnamable] is in search of a name: he wants to speak as author, to say je 
(I), and hence seize his own identity, without transforming himself into 
a ﬁctional character.”17
The “I” in the experience of a singular “I” observes this experience and 
tries to penetrate and reach out for his Self. After all, the dungeon is also 
the result of this because the subject is confronted with more than one “I” 
in itself.18 In fact each of them is an “I” experience. Considered from the 
Yücel Dursun: The Name of the Unnamable or Tragedy of Self in Samuel Beckett
L&A 2007.1.indd   24 21/2/08   7:54:22 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 17(1) July 2007, page 25 
phenomenological perspective of Edmund Husserl, these are cogitations, 
and the narrator’s attempt, at this point, to reach the transcendental ego 
is a transcendental-phenomenological epoché. We have mentioned that 
each singular situation of the teller resembles Husserl’s cogitationes. 
Husserl considers cogitationes as every conscious experience of the 
transcendental Ego (i.e. the Self). In this sense, the singular “I” situations 
of the narrator in the Unnamable are singular versions of cogitations, that 
is, singular situation of each conscious act such as imagining, rejecting, 
approving, perceiving, assessing, and desiring; as in the case of a subject, 
who imagines a variety of things, imagining a glass or marking a table 
singularly. More broadly speaking, it is a situation similar to an able-to-
desire subject’s want of “money” or “vacation”. In all these singular “I” 
situations there is another I (Ego) viewing, accompanying, and orienting 
its reﬂective attention to them, which is the transcendental Ego (Husserl 
31). As the narrator of the Unnamable, Iser says that he observes his 
Self and tries to penetrate it. For, in the Husserlian sense, he always sees 
himself as a singular “I” of Cogitationes, and while this remains the case, 
there is always a “thing” accompanying and viewing him. That is why 
the narrator in the Unnamable turns his attention to the accompanying 
“thing” so as to identify it and understand it. In a sense he wants to realize 
a Husserlian procedure. Bracketing each singular “I” situation, he wants 
to ﬁnd the viewer in “I” situations. And this, as Husserl explains, is an 
attempt to reduce the natural human ego and its psychological experience 
to a “transcendental-phenomenological Ego” “by phenomenological 
epoché (Husserl 26). Brieﬂy getting out of various singular “I” situations, 
he tries to reach his Self, the transcendental Ego. That is why it can be said 
that each singular “I” situation is a situation of imprisonment that needs 
to be overcome and reduced.
At the same time, with regards to the subject in pursuit of his Self, 
there is the problem where the subject loses his Self (the Self that is “out 
there”) in the very moment of seizure19 due to ﬁnding himself in a singular 
situation – for it is also in the circle of “Now and Here” in the Hegelian 
sense. In the very moment the subject feels to have overcome singular 
“I” situations, and therefore, particularities of “Now and Here”, he will 
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desire to experience his Self. However, as his experience is related to 
his conveyance of the experience – in order to be able to experience that 
situation, paradoxically, he must be in a process of conveying regarding 
the stipulator of the experience – the subject will again ﬁnd himself in a 
singular “I” situation in this very process of conveyance. For the stage of 
conveyance is made up of many singular situations. And for each singular 
situation there are singular reﬂective experiences of the subject. Therefore, 
the narrator faces a difﬁculty in trying to grasp the Gestalten perception 
of his Self by overcoming these particularities. We will call this problem 
“the Problem of the Self” – that is, the difﬁculty to reach out for the Self 
from singular “I” situations. The “Problem of the Self” becomes clear in a 
paradox with the narrator of The Unnamable: Silence and Articulation. 
The narrator is, on the one hand, desperate to keep his silence20 while 
on the other, he feels urged to speak.21 In fact, he describes this as a speech 
for silence.22 But why does he want to be silent? Why still, does he have 
to speak? It is because the narrator wants to hear his absolute voice.23 In 
other words, he seeks to listen to the voice of his Self, which is voiceless, 
but to do that, he must speak. He is urged to speak to keep silent.24 By 
speaking, he aims on the one hand at consuming all that should be spoken, 
and on the other he gets closer to his Self.25 He longs to tell all that can be 
said, and then keep his silence.26 In a way, the narrator ﬁnds himself in a 
paradoxical situation similar to that of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: On the one 
hand – since the Self is a state of silence that can not be spoken over – he 
adopts the idea, “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”;27 
while on the other, by saying “there is indeed the inexpressible” (#6.522), 
he tries to paradoxically articulate by getting closer to it through speech. 
For what cannot be expressed reveals itself in many ways (as the Self, in the 
Husserlian sense, showing itself by accompanying “I” singularities...).
In fact, the paradox comes afore – in the form of an urge to express 
himself and his Self as a whole – just at the moment when the narrator 
thinks he has reached his Self,28 or when he feels like listening to the sound 
of his silence. This informs us that there exists a rooted desire and tragedy 
that leads to the problem of the Self, i.e. the existence of the desire to 
express the Self, accompanying the desire in the subject’s efforts to reach 
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out for his Self through singular “I” experiences. This tragedy needs to 
be addressed, but before I elaborate on it, it would be useful to consider 
another circle rendered visible by the paradox: the state of the “I” in the 
“Other”. 
The I Within the Other, desired to be Otherized
In The Unnamable, the narrator meets various faces of his own whilst 
trying to listen to the sound of his silence. These faces, despite being 
different from his Self, nevertheless accompany that Self, and although it is 
sometimes difﬁcult to distinguish between them, he listens to their voices 
for a while. These voices tell him, in a way, that the “faces” are formed by 
the others through their teaching and lifestyles. They are the “faces” of 
many a kind. For instance, Mahood29 represents a loyal-to-the-teachings 
“face” formed directly by the teachers. Worm30 on the contrary, is an 
indirect face of the “I” made over the others, and opposes their teachings. 
The “I” conceives that these “faces” belong to him, but is aware that they 
are not part of his Self.31 It is at this very moment when voices multiply 
and the noises of the others are heard. In his efforts to become his Self, 
and to ﬁnd his self, the narrator faces the danger of being otherized by 
the others.32 This is another circle surrounding the doors of the dungeon, 
which he comes across with other doors while becoming Self and making 
himself the latter’s object. The circle is such that it adds Gordian knots to 
the chains of his tragedy. Whenever he tries to get out from the place he 
is in, he ﬁnds himself as an “other face” either shaped by their teachings, 
or as an “other face resisting to otherization”, negating and rejecting any 
teaching. Indeed, the subject himself is neither the “other face” (Mahood), 
nor the “other face resisting to otherization” (Worm). In Hegelian terms, 
these are the sites for consciousness where the subject seeks to achieve an 
awareness of his freedom, while in Nietzsche’s conception, he is either 
a “ﬂock man” who cannot perceive reality through his own eyes, or the 
“free man” who wants to see. However, they are still not the “tragic, 
overmen” who can perceive reality with their own eyes.33 That reality, for 
the narrator of The Unnamable, is his Self.34
Despite the subject being enclosed by all the circles35 we have mentioned 
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so far, he is nevertheless aware of his freedom; he knows that he is free.36 Yet 
what he wants is only to hear his own voice in all that noise and babble.37 
That is, he wants only to reach his self, and listen to the sound of a Self that 
does not have a voice. In a sense, this can be interpreted as an awareness 
of his freedom, which is why he resists otherization.38 Meanwhile, that 
resistance is both a motion and a progress; the motion is such that it’s a 
progress ceasing at itself by refusing (negating) the other, while gaining 
content through a mediation over it.39 In general terms, the progress is 
a Hegelian one, because within the latter’s conceptual framework, the 
negation of the narrator is a pure negation, which is the inherent power of 
the motion itself (Hegel 12). Still, the subject re-constitutes itself “through 
a reﬂection made over the otherness in itself” [Worm and Mahood in The 
Unnamable] (Hegel 10) This is his “being” process, where that “being” is 
understood as a circle presupposing its end as its goal, and one which 
has its end as its beginning. (Hegel 10) In short, the subject, who is itself 
situated at the beginning, returns to that beginning as in and for itself 
through the other that is for itself. But it does this by attaining content. 
(Hegel 14) Therefore, in this reﬂective mediation made over the other, the 
second beginning is not identical to the ﬁrst one; the former has content, 
while the latter presumes this as a goal. In The Unnamable, this content 
seems to be the consciousness of the “I”s in the “I” not being “I”.40 In 
other words, the narrator ﬁrst otherizes his own “faces” within him; the 
narrator determines this because, although Mahood and Worm are his 
own faces, they are nevertheless formed by others, i.e. they are the faces 
representing them, not him. Thus, he can also respond to his own self 
being otherized. He negates these “faces,” so to say, and veriﬁes their un-
belongingness to him. He then makes these “faces” in him – they are faces 
of the mediation related to the other – “for himself”, thinking within their 
otherness; anything that may exist in persona of Mahood and Worm is a 
notion that regards the ﬁnding of his Self. As a result of the negation and 
mediation mentioned above, he is able to conceive and re-discover himself. 
This conception reveals to him that the Self (in himself) is different from 
the other “I”s. It can be said that the subject of The Unnamable, as part of 
the “in itself”, makes other “faces” (like Worm and Mahood) “for itself,” 
Yücel Dursun: The Name of the Unnamable or Tragedy of Self in Samuel Beckett
L&A 2007.1.indd   28 21/2/08   7:54:23 AM
Literature  & Aesthetics 17(1) July 2007, page 29 
moving towards his Self through a mediation over them, and reaching his 
Self as a result of the activity. As “in itself” then, he is trying to achieve, 
in sense, the consciousness of his freedom.
Yet, for the subject of The Unnamable, there is a tragic point in this 
motive for progress; for while trying to penetrate into his Self, he is also 
in an effort to express and articulate himself. 
And Tragedy...
The following words by the narrator are signiﬁcant: “But within, 
motionless, I can live, and utter me, for no ears but my own.” (Beckett 
327) It can be seen that the narrator, while listening to his own voice, that 
is to say, while viewing his Self, wants also to express and articulate this 
state of viewing. Nevertheless, he is aware of the impossibility of this: “...
but it’s my turn, I too have the right to be shown impossible.” (Beckett 
379), for as soon as he expresses his self, he will fall from the state of 
watching his Self down to a singular “I” situation or experience; that is, 
in the stage of expression, he is no longer the looker, but the one looked 
at.41 However, in the case of viewing or experiencing himself, or his Self 
as a whole, he will not have a voice, as the latter is only an “entirely 
disembodied voice”.42 This is the point where language disappears.43 It is 
a situation where there’s only one experience. In this sense, it resembles 
the noesis state of Plato’s philosopher watching the ideas.44 That point is a 
stage in which seeing through thinking becomes possible. Still, he strives 
to overcome the problem of Self and reach the stage where that Self is 
overcome,45 seeking his Self and the state of silence there. That absolute 
state of silence is all that he is sure of, which explains why he wants to 
be silent so as to experience it. Yet, at this very moment, he has to speak 
to reach that state – since to write (i.e. speak) is the prerequisite for the 
reﬂection necessary to reach his Self – and describe what is experienced. 
Hence, there appears a complete tragedy; a tragedy that is personiﬁed by 
the very key – the obligation to speak – used by the subject to overcome 
the surrounding circles, both locking and unlocking the doors.
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To Conclude...
It is all because the subject in The Unnamable had to speak (and therefore 
write) to reach out for his Self. Through speech, he was orienting his 
reﬂective attention to the perception which made him speak, and in trying 
to articulate the reﬂective attention formed at this stage, he was taking a 
course in this direction to experience his Self. The course that lay ahead 
was realized through a series of negations and mediations. All this progress 
was characterized, to begin with, by the innermost circle where the subject 
was situated; in the state of innermost captivity (being “Now” and “Here”. 
From that innermost circle, the next circle (of singular “I” situations) 
followed, and then the “faces” made up of many singular “I”s (as a 
general “I” situation). Finally, there is an attempt to overcome the inter-
subjectivity that was established through its “Otherness” connection. As a 
result, throughout all these transcending stages, the narrator had to reﬂect, 
or speak, in order to actualize “transcending”. In this respect, “to speak” 
was in some way functioning as a reﬂection, and it also served as a key 
to overcome the states of imprisonment through reﬂection. Furthermore, 
because everything was based on the subject’s desire to experience himself 
as a whole, “to speak” also functioned as a key to locking the doors. 
And the subject has motive to describe what is experienced (the state of 
“silence”), as well as an obligation of speech to reach that state. Even if 
the ending condition – of the process of reaching the Self and experiencing 
it – is expressed as putting an end to reﬂection, and merely experiencing 
the point reached, this condition itself is eliminated qua the subject in the 
Unnamable. Hence, desire to reach that state makes the situation more 
difﬁcult, and exposes the “locking” role of the key.
This, in turn, re-starts the whole chain of reﬂections, the discourse, to be 
silent again. All this goes on incessantly, and as it does, the impossibility 
of the situation becomes clear. The condition for the narrator’s discourse 
to cease (the experience of Self and silence) is an impossibility – because 
even if the same condition existed for the cease-point, it would still be a 
point (description point) triggering the chain of discourse – but one that 
is nevertheless necessary for the discourse to exist until that cease-point. 
Thus, the narrator of The Unnamable has to go on experiencing the tragedy 
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exposed by this impossibility, and no matter what the consideration is, 
he cannot stop.
This is why at the very end of the Trilogy, in The Unnamable, the narrator 
ﬁnishes his tragedy saying: “...it will be the silence, where I am, I don’t 
know, I’ll never know, in the silence you don’t know, you must go on, I 
can’t go on, I’ll go on.” (Beckett 418).
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hardly say, but in a sharp curve which, if I continued to follow it, seemed likely to restore me to 
my point of departure, or to one adjacent. I must have got embroiled in a kind of inverted spiral, 
I mean one the coils of which, instead of widening more and more, grew narrower and narrower 
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41  “As if anyone were looking at me! As if it were I !” (Beckett 397).
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44  For a discussion about the possibility or impossibility of contemplating the self see (Gendron 48-
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45  “...if only I could go there, if only I could describe it...” (Beckett 405).
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